In the unfolding geopolitics of the 21st century, few bilateral dynamics hold as much significance as the relationship between India and China. Home to nearly 2.8 billion people and accounting for a combined 17 percent of global GDP (in nominal terms), the two Asian giants are not only regional powerhouses but also pivotal players in determining the trajectory of the international order. From climate change and trade to technology and security, the possibility, or impossibility, of India-China collaboration has implications that extend far beyond Asia, especially for the Global South.
For much of the past two decades, the international system has been tilting toward multipolarity. The post-Cold War U.S.-led liberal order is under strain, challenged both by Washington’s own strategic choices and by the rise of non-Western powers. In this emerging environment, India and China are positioned as the flagbearers of a more plural global governance system in which the voices of the Global South are amplified. Their shared historical experience of colonial exploitation lends them moral authority to argue for reforms at institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.
Yet the potential for collaboration often collides with deep structural mistrust. Border disputes, military standoffs, and competing regional ambitions put severe constraints on the idea of strategic partnership. India’s closer ties with the United States and its participation in frameworks like the Quad sit uneasily with Beijing’s global Belt and Road Initiative and its alignment with Moscow. The rivalry is not merely territorial, it is about two competing visions of regional leadership.
Nevertheless, there are converging interests that might form the basis of pragmatic cooperation. Both countries are energy-intensive economies with a vested interest in stabilizing oil markets and accelerating the transition to renewable energy. On climate change, India and China can leverage their weight to push for differentiated responsibilities, ensuring that the burden of decarbonization falls more fairly on industrialized nations. Similarly, in global trade negotiations, their vast markets serve as bargaining chips to resist protectionism in the developed world while creating favorable conditions for other emerging economies.
From a Global South perspective, India-China cooperation could facilitate the democratization of the international order. Initiatives within BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the New Development Bank demonstrate the embryonic potential of alternative institutions that might eventually rival Western-led frameworks. If Delhi and Beijing were to coordinate on supply chains, digital regulation, and development finance, they could help rewrite the rules of globalization in ways that better serve the priorities of the global majority, rather than the preferences of advanced economies alone.
The challenge lies in reconciling geopolitical rivalry with functional cooperation. The precedent of “competitive coexistence” may offer a pathway, where competition is acknowledged but circumscribed, allowing for selective coordination on shared global issues. For policymakers in the Global South, the hope is that India and China will view leadership not as a zero-sum contest but as a joint responsibility in shaping a more inclusive and equitable world order.
Whether this possibility materializes remains uncertain. What is certain, however, is that the contours of the 21st century, on issues ranging from climate governance to economic rebalancing, cannot be drawn without India and China, either working together or at cross-purposes. How they choose to engage will define not only their own futures but also the prospects of the entire Global South.
